1 Modelling Rational Agents
1.1  Overview
1.2  Decision matrices
1.3  Belief, desire, and degrees
1.4  Solving decision problems
1.5  The problem of intentionality
2 Belief as Probability
2.1  Subjective and objective probability
2.2  Probability theory
2.3  Some rules of probability
2.4  Conditional probability
2.5  Some more rules of probability
3 Probabilism
3.1  Justifying the probability axioms
3.2  The betting interpretation
3.3  The Dutch book theorem
3.4  Problems with the betting interpretation
3.5  A Dutch book argument
3.6  Comparative credence
4 Further Constraints on Rational Belief
4.1  Belief and perception
4.2  Conditionalization
4.3  Induction and Indifference
4.4  Probability coordination
4.5  Confirmation
5 Utility
5.1  Two conceptions of utility
5.2  Sources of utility
5.3  The structure of utility
5.4  Basic desire
6 Preference
6.1  The ordinalist challenge
6.2  Scales
6.3  Utility from preference
6.4  The von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms
6.5  Utility and credence from preference
6.6  Preference from choice?
7 Separability
7.1  The construction of utility
7.2  Additivity
7.3  Separability
7.4  Separability across time
7.5  Harsanyi’s “proof of utilitarianism”
8 Why MEU?
8.1  Arguments for the MEU Principle
8.2  Money pumps and sequential choice
8.3  The long run
8.4  Risk aversion
8.5  Redescribing the outcomes
9 Evidential and Causal Decision Theory
9.1  Evidential Decision Theory
9.2  Newcomb’s Problem
9.3  More realistic Newcomb Problems?
9.4  Causal Decision Theories
9.5  Unstable decision problems
10 Game Theory
10.1  Games
10.2  Nash equilibria
10.3  Zero-sum games
10.4  Harder games
10.5  Games with several moves
10.6  Evolutionary game theory
11 Bounded Rationality
11.1  Models and reality
11.2  Avoiding computational costs
11.3  Reducing computational costs
11.4  “Non-expected utility theories”
11.5  Imprecise credence and utility